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ABSTRACT
This paper aims at shedding some light on the mechanisms of pricing the 
EMU countries’ sovereign bonds in ﬁnancial markets. Employing the Augmen-
ted Mean Group (AMG) estimator, we ﬁnd that major changes have occurred 
in terms of variables underlying sovereign risk. Since 2009, macroeconomic 
and ﬁscal fundamentals has started to play a more important role, but only 
those that capture domestic demand evolution. In contrast, price competiti-
veness seems less important. The second conclusion lies in reversed attitude 
towards banking sector imbalances, as compared to the earlier period. One 
of the problems addressed concerns the horizon of projected macroeconomic 
and ﬁscal variables taken into account. The paper presents some evidence that 
ﬁnancial markets have become more myopic and started to rely on short-term 
forecasts, whilst they had tended to encompass longer-term forecast horizon 
before the crisis.
Keywords: Financial Crisis; Fiscal Policy; EMU; Panel Estimation.
RESUMEN
Este trabajo tiene por objeto arrojar luz sobre los mecanismos de ﬁjación 
de precios de bonos soberanos de los países de la UEM en los mercados ﬁ-
nancieros. Empleando el estimador Aumentado Medio del Grupo (Augmented 
Mean Group - AMG), nos encontramos grandes cambios en términos de las 
variables subyacentes del riesgo soberano. Desde 2009, los fundamentos ma-
croeconómicos y ﬁscales han comenzado a desempeñar un papel más impor-
tante, pero sólo aquellos que captan la evolución de la demanda interna. Por el 
contrario, la competitividad de precios parece menos importante. La segunda 
conclusión radica en la actitud invertida hacia los desequilibrios del sector 
bancario, cuando se compara con el período anterior. En este sentido, uno de 
los problemas abordados se reﬁere al horizonte de las variables macroeconó-
micas y ﬁscales proyectadas tomadas en cuenta. El artículo presenta pruebas 
de que los mercados ﬁnancieros se han vuelto más miopes y comenzaron a 
conﬁar en los pronósticos a corto plazo, mientras que habían tendido a abar-
car horizontes de pronóstico a más largo plazo antes de la crisis.
Palabras clave: Crisis ﬁnanciera; política ﬁscal; UEM; Estimación panel.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C23, E43, E62, F34, G01, G12, H60
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1. INTRODUCTION
The reemergence of sovereign spreads in 2008 in EMU was often interpre-
ted as rapid improvement in the quality of credit risk assessment process in 
ﬁnancial markets (see: Attinasi et al., 2009, De Grauwe and Ji, 2012). Indeed, 
yields increased most for Greek, Irish and Portuguese bonds. While each of 
these countries had its own unique conglomerate of problems, all had accumu-
lated massive imbalances that made them face a higher credit risk premium. 
This perceived improvement in credit risk assessment pushed some govern-
ments to immediately implement actions towards reducing imbalances (mostly 
in public ﬁnance) in the form of austerity programs. Governments and societies 
in the troubled countries were cheered by some (notably liberal) economists 
arguing that non-Keynesian (and thus expansionary) effects might offset the 
Keynesian ones even in the short-run if certain conditions are satisﬁed – most 
importantly when public debt is high and adjustment is based on the expen-
diture side (see e.g. Borys et al., 2014). To back their theoretical arguments, 
historical examples were brought up of expansionary consolidation episodes 
from Denmark and Ireland in 1980s (see: IMF, 2010). But short-run effects of 
ﬁscal consolidations did not meet these optimistic expectations. No signs of 
non-Keynesian effects were being noticed and  disappointment grew. In conse-
quence, theoretical opposition (broadly associated with the “saltwater” econo-
mics) started to grow against severe austerity, which was promptly spotted in 
the countries facing it. The possibility of non-Keynesian effects were more and 
more often called unfeasible in the short-run and the environment of liquidity 
trap (Corsetti, 2012).
Both Corsetti (2012) and Portes (2012) claimed that severe ﬁscal ad-
justments not only shrink GDP, but can also be counter-productive i.e. they 
can raise rather than lower the debt to GDP ratio. This is because ﬁnancial 
markets can take both ﬁscal situation and growth perspectives into account 
when assessing credit risk. Growth-stiﬂing austerity programs can therefore 
not only reduce the denominator of the debt to GDP ratio (especially under 
liquidity trap), but also raise the numerator due to higher interest payments. 
Boussard et al. (2012) also make the point that if ﬁnancial markets are myopic, 
than ﬁscal adjustment might be counter-productive in the short-run. They add 
however that under realistic assumptions this phenomenon could be reversible 
within few years from the start of the adjustment.
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The discussion reported above shows that the exact mechanisms of pricing 
government bonds in ﬁnancial markets are not known, especially since the crisis 
started to spread throughout Europe. Government bond yields evolution suggest 
that a structural break occurred sometime around (or not long after) the Lehman 
Brothers collapse in September 2008. New mechanisms are not precisely known, 
perhaps even among the market agents that price the bonds, and understanding 
them requires answering several important questions, such as: Have sovereign 
spreads indeed increased due to a better credit-risk assessment or have global 
factors played a more important role? If it is credit risk which is to be blamed, how 
do ﬁnancial markets identify factors of this risk? What is the role of the private 
sector (especially nested in banks) in elevating credit risk, if markets already noti-
ce that private imbalances might smoothly spill-over to the public sector, fuelling 
sovereign imbalances? But there are also other questions, which received little 
attention so far in the literature. How forward looking are ﬁnancial markets? Have 
they become more myopic or more forward-looking during the crisis?
This paper aims at answering all the questions formulated above with respect 
to EMU countries. Its biggest value added lies in addressing last two questions. 
We construct four alternative expectation schemes and test how far did ﬁnancial 
markets reach while pricing bonds before the crisis, and have their horizons exten-
ded or shortened in the crisis regime. Another novelty can be found in the method 
employed. We make use of the relatively new Augmented Mean Group (AMG) 
estimator, developed by Eberhardt and Bond (2009), which accommodates some 
of the frequent problems of panel data models.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Second section contains 
literature review. Section three presents data and the empirical model. Section 
four discusses the results. Summary recapitulates main ﬁndings and also proposes 
directions for future research.
2. RELATED LITERATURE
The run-up period towards creating the EMU in mid-1990s resulted in steady 
equalization of government bond yields across its founding member states. This 
phenomenon was triggered by eliminating exchange rate risk and a credit of trust 
given by ﬁnancial markets to countries with less solid macroeconomic fundamen-
tals. The credit was anticipated to be guaranteed exogenously - by the most cre-
dible states as well as endogenously – by policy efforts to fulﬁll the Maastricht 
criteria and thus eliminate major internal imbalances.
In this environment, mechanisms of bond yield determination in ﬁnancial mar-
kets have become less an issue of interest. Having said that, there were several im-
portant contributions in the ﬁeld, just to mention Codogno et al. (2003),  Geyer et 
al. (2004), Pagano and von Thadden (2004), Favero et al. (2005) or Gómez-Puig 
(2008). But indeed, it was not before the rapid emergence of spreads activated by 
the ﬁnancial crisis in 2008, when its determinants attracted a lot of attention and 
numerous papers started to appear.
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Generally, two approaches towards analyzing spread determinants can be 
identiﬁed. The ﬁrst approach is focused on high-frequency ﬂuctuations, driven 
by ﬁnancial variables, associated with e.g. risk perception volatility, liquidity 
factors and all kinds of “events”, such as new data releases, policy announce-
ments and political events. This approach, based on high-frequency data, is 
also very useful for tracking contagion effects, but it is less handy at exploring 
the role of macroeconomic and ﬁscal fundamentals. 
The second approach is complementary to the previous one with its aim to un-
veil long-run determinants of spreads. From a theoretical point of view, bond yield 
of an EMU member state contains a risk-free asset interest rate, an EMU common 
factor (related to expected exchange rate volatility and monetary policy stance), 
country-speciﬁc credit risk premiums and also global risk aversion factor. Modeling 
deviations from yields on German bunds leaves us with all but ﬁrst two compo-
nents, but what remains is sufﬁciently complex. We are also far from reaching 
consensus on precisely which variables are responsible for driving the spreads.
The least controversial seems to be the global risk factor - most of studies 
ﬁnd some measure of it to signiﬁcantly determine sovereign bond spreads. For 
example, Codogno et al. (2003) reach such conclusion analyzing the pre-EMU 
period as well as its ﬁrst years. Unsurprisingly, global risks also turns out to 
be signiﬁcant in later studies, especially those encompassing some episodes 
of the crisis (see: Attinasi, et al. 2009, Gerlach et al., 2010, Caggiano and 
Greco, 2011). Global risk ﬂuctuations are normally approximated by spreads 
between interest rates on (safe haven) US Treasuries and medium-risk corpo-
rate bonds (e.g. Bernoth et al., 2003, Codogno, et al., 2003, Gerlach et al., 
2010, Schuknecht et al. 2010). A frequently used alternative variable is the VIX 
index1. Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2010) show that the choice between the two 
approaches to capture global risk is not very important because both do the 
job quite well and in a similar way. 
There are more doubts regarding bond market liquidity, encompassing 
market depth (volume of transactions) and market breadth (market price sen-
sitivity to large-scale transactions, see: Barrios, et al., 2009). Low liquidity 
means the risk of accepting high bid-ask spreads. Variables used to captu-
re liquidity risk are: bid-ask spreads, value of debt outstanding or volume of 
bonds exchanged within a unit of time. Empirical evidence for their signiﬁcance 
is mixed. Attinasi et al. (2009), Barrios et al. (2009),Gerlach et al (2010) ﬁnd 
liquidity risk to be signiﬁcant while Bernoth and Erdogan (2010) as well as 
Schuknecht et al. (2010) arrive at opposite conclusions, regardless the period 
under consideration. Codogno et al. (2003) claim that importance of liquidity 
in the early days of EMU was already limited. Barrios et al. (2009) note an 
important complication related to using liquidity variables in spread equations. 
While credit risk is determined by slow-moving ﬁscal and macroeconomic va-
riables, liquidity-related factors inﬂuence yields at higher frequencies.
1 Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index – an implied volatility index of S&P 500 
options.
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Conclusions on factors inﬂuencing credit risk premium differ considerably, 
depending on selected variables and estimation method. Indeed, general ma-
croeconomic and ﬁscal position can be described with plethora of variables. 
If we additionally account for possible nonlinearities, the task to model credit 
risk determinants of spreads becomes even more complicated. 
First of all, selected variables must cover the situation of at least three 
broad sectors: public ﬁnance, real economy and banking sector (which, to 
some extent reﬂects private sector imbalances). It seems that while ﬁrst two 
are always given sufﬁcient attention, the banking sector is not always appre-
ciated. 
The relationship between public debt and sovereign spreads had been do-
cumented even before the EMU was established (see: Alesina, et al., 1992, 
Goldstein and Woglom, 1992). More recent results have been mixed.  Schuk-
necht et al. (2010) show that the estimated parameters capturing impact of 
public debt changes on spreads have become several times larger since the 
crisis began in 2008. Some studies, like  Barrios et al. (2010) or Caggiano and 
Greco (2011) show that this impact has been nonlinear, i.e. high-debt countries 
were punished relatively severely in ﬁnancial markets. Afonso et al. (2012) ﬁnd 
the debt/GDP ratio to be insigniﬁcant. Most papers also conﬁrm the importan-
ce of general government balance, but (again) Afonso et al. (2012) provide only 
weak support here.
From an investor’s point of view, factors important for assessing credit risk 
can be found in real economy. Codogno et al. (2003) argue that future ability 
to service debt depends on actual and future level of investment and income. 
High GDP dynamics on the one hand helps to regain/keep public ﬁnance sustai-
nable and, on the other hand, can signal solid competitiveness. Caggiano and 
Greco (2011) show that the impact of short-run GDP dynamics expectations 
has become more important in the crisis period, as compared to earlier years.
Competitiveness developments is indeed identiﬁed as potentially impor-
tant factor and is therefore sometimes modeled explicitly. Barrios et al. (2010) 
rely on current account balance (in per cent of GDP) and conﬁrm its signiﬁcan-
ce. Afonso et al. (2012) use real exchange rate measure to capture external 
competitiveness and ﬁnd it to be signiﬁcant only in the crisis period.
There has been growing literature recently, focusing on the sovereign-ban-
king nexus and revealing links between banking sector imbalances and sove-
reign spreads. Indeed, ﬁnancial markets might be increasingly aware of  this 
problem, especially after the events in Ireland, where the need to recapitalize 
banks added nearly 50 per cent to the debt/GDP ratio within just four years. 
This meant advancing from one the lowest to fourth highest public debt ratio 
among all EU countries. Other countries offered guarantees to support ban-
king sector, but even in absence of explicit guarantees, it is obvious that banks 
can raise sovereign credit risk at least until full-scale banking union with cre-
dible resolution mechanisms is ﬁrmly in place. It should be emphasized that 
depending on macroeconomic situation, positive or negative feedback loops 
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can be generated by the banking sector. In good times, large banking sector 
supports growth and is also a source of revenues (see. Gerlach et al. 2010). In 
bad times however, quality of assets tend to deteriorate and public funds can 
get under pressure as the bail-out risk increases. 
Even if direct bailing out is not a necessity, support for the banks may be 
exercised as an alternative to the painful strong deleveraging, leading to credit 
crunch that further stiﬂes consumption and investment demand, if the latter is 
perceived more costly. On top of this, banks’ balance sheets reﬂect in part pri-
vate sector imbalances (like indebtness of households and non-ﬁnancial enter-
prises), which are another potential source of sovereign credit risk. Empirical 
evidence for the impact of public support action announcements of sovereign 
spreads are provided by Acharya et al. (2011). Also Gerlach et al. (2010) claim 
that the size of the banking sector has become a factor raising risk premium, 
especially during high global risk aversion periods.
In addition to the variables discussed above, some studies use credit ra-
tings as regressors (Manganelli and Wolswijk, 2009, De Santis, 2012). We 
should keep in mind however that ratings are subject to limited variability and 
can introduce endogeneity in the model as they themselves are inﬂuenced 
by the evolution of (mostly) macroeconomic, ﬁscal and ﬁnancial variables and 
also tend to react to spreads rather than drive them (Gonzales-Rozada, et al., 
2008). 
3. DATA
In line with most empirical studies, we assume that sovereign spreads are 
determined by a number of factors, related to developments in real economy, 
public ﬁnance, ﬁnancial sector and international risk aversion. The dependent 
variable is deviation of benchmark 10-years government bond yield from its 
German counterpart and these data are taken from Eurostat.
Before performing quantitative analysis, we need to decide on the type of 
ﬁscal and macroeconomic variables used: historical versus expected. Historical 
data are readily available in statistical databases, which simpliﬁes research and 
saves time. The relatively high popularity of employing historical data could 
have been observed mostly before the outbreak of the crisis (Bernoth et al., 
2003, Codogno et al., 2003) but some studies relied on them also more re-
cently (e.g. Aßmann and Boysen-Hogrefe, 2009, De Grauwe and Ji, 2012). The 
majority of papers however use expected data (real-time forecasts) in view that 
ﬁnancial markets must be trying to discount future economic developments 
since they determine the expected return. This is the view to which we subs-
cribe in our paper.
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FIGURE 1. GOVERNMENT BOND SPREADS (IN BASIS POINTS) AND CURRENT YEAR EXPECTED GENERAL GOVERNMENT 
BALANCE (IN PERCENT OF GDP)
Notes: General government balance – deviations from German.
Source: Eurostat data.
There is a number of candidate variables to capture various dimensions of 
credit risk. Fig. 1 shows that the state of public ﬁnance could have played an 
important role for determining yields, but only in the crisis period, since 2009. 
During “normal times” any deviations from the German government balance 
seem to exert no impact on government bond spreads. Another important 
factors might be tracked in real economy. When proxied by GDP growth rate, 
real sphere developments are indeed associated with spreads, at least as long 
as the crisis period is considered (see: ﬁg. 2). It is more difﬁcult to reveal any 
relationships between the two plotted variables during normal times.
We use the following variables as regressors to model sovereign spreads in 
EMU. The real economy situation is covered by (expected) GDP growth (annua-
lized, in per cent), unemployment rate (in per cent), unit labour cost (index) and 
current account balance (in per cent of GDP). To deﬁne ﬁscal position we have at 
our disposal (expected) general government deﬁcit and debt (both in per cent of 
GDP). We made attempts to replace general government balance by cyclically-
adjusted general government balance (in per cent of potential GDP), but they 
were not successful2. Macroeconomic and ﬁscal data come from bi-annual OECD 
Economic Outlooks. Risk from the banking sector is covered by three alternative 
ratios: total assets to GDP, total loans to private deposits and credit to depo-
2 One of the important problems might be the measurement problem related to low credibility of 
current potential GDP and output gaps estimates.
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sits. These data come from ECB Statistical Data Warehouse. Because we model 
spreads deviations from German bond yields, all the above country-speciﬁc va-
riables are also deviations from their respective values in Germany.
Global risk aversion factor is proxied by the deviation between yield on 
10-year US Treasuries and average yield on Baa-rated corporate bonds. The 
source of these data is Bureau for Economic Analysis (BEA). We decided not 
to include any proxy for liquidity of domestic government bond market due to 
the problems with different frequency of credit and liquidity risk determinants 
(Barrios et al., 2009) and the likely collinearity with debt to GDP ratio. 
FIGURE 2. GOVERNMENT BOND SPREADS (IN BASIS POINTS) AND CURRENT YEAR EXPECTED GDP GROWTH RATE 
(IN PERCENT)
Notes: GDP growth rate – deviations from the value in Germany.
Source: Eurostat data.
The biggest problem with the created dataset is mixed-frequency of data. 
Especially macroeconomic and ﬁscal projected data come at low frequency 
(bi-annually). This problem is usually solved by linear or cubic interpolation to 
quarterly or even monthly frequency (see: Alexopoulou et al., 2009, Schukne-
cht et al, 2010, among others). 
Instead of simple interpolation, we provide a model-based way of solving 
this problem by constructing four alternative, testable expectation schemes. 
Before putting forward the proposed expectation schemes, basic assumptions 
should be unveiled. OECD Economic Outlook is released every June and De-
cember. Since projections are based on a pool of data available by that time, 
we assume that they are fully anticipated in (respectively) second and fourth 
quarter. The questions are: how do expectations evolve between subsequently 
released projections? Do ﬁnancial markets, while assessing sovereign risk, take 
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account of forecasts for the current year, the next year, or gradually extend 
their horizon?3
FIGURE 3. 10-YEAR GERMAN GOVERNMENT BOND YIELDS AND GLOBAL RISK INDICATOR (SPREAD BETWEEN YIELD 
ON 10-YEAR US TREASURIES AND AVERAGE YIELD ON BAA-RATED CORPORATE BONDS)
Source of data: Eurostat.
To get at least partial insight into ﬁnancial markets’ behavior, four following 
alternative expectation schemes, based on linear interpolation, are construc-
ted4:
1. Smoothed current-year projections: in the second and fourth quarter they 
are taken from OECD Economic Outlooks, whilst in the ﬁrst and third quarter 
interpolated current-year forecasts are used. This is an assumption consistent 
with myopic ﬁnancial markets.
2. Forecasts smoothed as in scheme (1), but referring to next year. In this scheme 
ﬁnancial markets react to the newest forecasts (and are therefore more 
forward-looking), since current-year forecasts are already discounted in yields.
3. Weighted forecasts for the recently passed year, current and next year (gradual 
shift). 
4. Forecasts interpolated as in schemes (1) and (2) and then, in second and fourth 
quarter, weighted as in scheme (3). This scheme also reﬂects gradual shift and 
additionally smooth adjustment of forecasts.
Descriptive statistics of the complete data set is provided in table 1.
3  Due to lack of longer-term forecasts of some variables it is assumed that only current and next year 
forecasts can determine credit risk.
4  Details of the four expectation schemes construction are presented in Annex.
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TABLE 1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS.
Variable* Description
Expectation
 scheme
Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
spr
Spread of 10Y gover-
nment bond over 10Y 
German Bunds (in %)
- 627 0.91 2.47 -1.25 23.98
risk
Spread between US 
Treasuries and Baa-rated 
corporate bonds (in %)
- 638 4.34 1.87 1.03 8.33
loandep Loan to deposit ratio - 620 0.05 0.41 -0.86 1.50
capass Capital to asset ratio - 638 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.08
crdep Credit to deposit ratio - 621 0.23 0.44 -0.74 1.96
ggbal1
General government ba-
lance (per cent of GDP)
1 630 0.05 3.50 -28.34 7.88
ggbal2 2 620 0.21 2.74 -7.64 8.23
ggbal3 3 629 0.21 3.08 -17.49 7.21
ggbal4 4 619 0.09 3.31 -20.71 7.04
ca1
Current account balance 
(per cent of GDP)
1 629 -3.84 6.03 -23.24 11.52
ca2 2 618 -4.06 5.90 -22.94 12.36
ca3 3 627 -3.86 5.99 -23.24 11.73
ca4 4 618 -3.96 5.97 -23.24 11.52
debt1
General government 
debt (per cent of GDP)
1 630 0.54 31.21 -64.48 94.88
debt2 2 620 0.52 31.42 -62.47 109.38
debt3 3 630 0.53 31.21 -64.48 104.84
debt4 4 620 0.39 31.28 -64.48 101.52
gdp1
GDP growth rate (in %)
1 638 0.38 2.05 -9.31 7.47
gdp2 2 627 0.43 1.39 -5.21 5.07
gdp3 3 627 0.41 1.80 -6.52 6.63
gdp4 4 627 0.38 1.91 -8.26 6.83
ulc1
Unit labour cost (index)
1 599 0.13 0.11 -0.57 0.93
ulc2 2 589 0.15 0.12 -0.63 0.96
ulc3 3 594 0.14 0.11 -0.13 0.93
ulc4 4 588 0.14 0.11 -0.59 0.93
unr1
Unemployment rate 
(in %)
1 638 0.44 4.52 -7.58 22.77
unr2 2 627 0.63 4.63 -6.99 23.56
unr3 3 638 0.42 4.50 -7.58 22.77
unr4 4 627 0.50 4.53 -7.58 22.77
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gass1
Gross government assets 
(per cent of GDP)
1 585 8.71 25.16 -19.43 98.88
gass2 2 575 9.31 25.57 -19.33 100.05
gass3 3 581 8.92 25.28 -19.33 99.17
gass4 4 573 8.93 25.29 -19.33 98.88
*all variables expressed as deviation from the respective values in Germany.
4.EMPIRICAL MODEL
Having constructed the four sets of expected macro and ﬁscal variables, 
we use them as regressors, along with banking sector variables and the global 
risk factor proxy, to model sovereign spreads. The equation parameters are 
estimated with the Augmented Mean Group (AMG) estimator, introduced by 
Eberhardt and Bond (2009), that allows for cross-sectional dependence by 
including a “common dynamic process” in the group regressions (see: Afonso, 
Jalles, 2011). The multi-factor framework of AMG estimation also accommoda-
tes endogeneity when it arises from common factors driving both dependent 
and independent variables (Lanzafame, 2013).
The AMG approach refers to the following three-stage procedure. The ﬁrst 
stage relies on the pooled OLS model, which is estimated in ﬁrst-differences, 
augmented with T-1 (ﬁrst-differenced) time dummies:
   
(1)
Where dit is a vector of ﬁrst-differenced dependent variables Xit and coe-
fﬁcients Ct=ȝt* on the ﬁrst-differenced year dummies represent an estimated 
cross-section average unobservable component driving sovereign spreads, re-
ferred to as “common dynamic process”.
In the second stage, coefﬁcients ct (relabeled as ȝt*) are used as explicit 
variables in the group-speciﬁc regressions:
  
(2)
where 
Ȗi represent country-speciﬁc factor loadings on the common, un-
observable dynamic process and rt is a measure of global risk aversion. The 
common dynamic process therefore encompasses all the remaining (auxiliary 
to global risk) unobservable factors that drive sovereign spreads and are not 
country-speciﬁc. There are various potential factors which build this process, 
such as the risk of EMU break-up or changes in investors’ preferences, but 
also investing opportunities in other parts of the World, which may have an 
impact on capital ﬂows and thus spreads. For example, a reduced pool of world 
safe-haven assets increases demand for German (safe-haven) bonds and dri-
)
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ves EMU sovereign spreads symmetrically up. Filtering out these information 
should reduce bias on observable fundamental macro and ﬁscal variables that 
will be included in the xit vector.
In the third stage, the group-speciﬁc model parameters are averaged across 
the panel, just like in the Mean Group (MG) and Common Correlated Effects 
Mean Group (CCEMG) estimators: 
   
(3)
In addition to dealing with the cross-section dependence and endogeneity 
problems, AMG estimator allows us to estimate a model with a mixture of sta-
tionary and nonstationary variables (regardless whether cointegrated or not). 
Consequently, performing unit root diagnostics of our time-series is redundant 
and we omit this step.
5. RESULTS 
In the ﬁrst, pre-crisis period, lowest root mean squared errors were ge-
nerated in models based on the fourth expectations scheme (weighted and 
smoothed forecasts, encompassing both current year and one year ahead). 
The respective results are shown in table 2 below5. The ﬁrst (myopic) expecta-
tions scheme produced only marginally worse results: RMSEs within this sche-
me were 1.6-10% higher in 8 out of 9 estimates and lower in one remaining 
case. All the other schemes turned out to be signiﬁcantly worse.
Turning to the assessment of country-speciﬁc fundamentals as determi-
nants of sovereign spreads, the results suggest their impact to be relatively 
weak. Despite allowing for non-linearity in the impact of government debt, 
its ratio to GDP was not found to be signiﬁcant in any speciﬁcation. Even the 
dummy variable capturing debt/GDP ratio exceeding its value in Germany by 
more than 30 percentage points (debt30) did not appear important. Some 
evidence was found for signiﬁcance of general government balance, although 
its impact was not found to be strong. Macroeconomic fundamentals which 
proved signiﬁcant in our estimations were (usually) current account to GDP 
ratio and the unemployment rate. Unit labour costs and GDP growth did not 
make important determinants. The signiﬁcance of unemployment rate and in-
signiﬁcance of GDP growth may suggest that output gap was more important 
than potential GDP growth rate (as low unemployment and low GDP growth 
was preferred to high unemployment combined with fast GDP growth). Insig-
niﬁcance of labour costs can be easily reconciled with signiﬁcance of current 
account, even if so much has been said about Greece’s loss of competitiveness 
during the EMU period. In the EMU advanced economies, non-price compe-
5 The remaining estimates results are not reported to save space and are available upon request.
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titiveness can matter more than price competitiveness. Rising costs of labour 
do not affect credit risk if current account is still able to improve which, by the 
way, was not the case in Greece.
All in all however, the results are generally consistent with numerous papers 
suggesting mispricing sovereign risk prior to the crisis and the detachment of 
credit risk assessment from country-speciﬁc macroeconomic and ﬁscal funda-
mentals (Attinasi, et al., 2009, De Grauwe and Ji, 2012).
The estimated parameters of ﬁnancial variables are interesting. Be it credit 
to deposit or loan to deposit ratio, coefﬁcients on these variables appear sig-
niﬁcantly negative, suggesting that ﬁnancial markets favoured countries with 
aggressive banks, maintaining high leverage ratios. However, the structure of 
liabilities might also have mattered. When capital to asset ratio is used, the 
coefﬁcient loses signiﬁcance, which suggests that even before the crisis raising 
capital was preferred to other types of funding.
The most puzzling are some weak signs of positive relationship between 
government assets and sovereign spreads. While in principle large values of 
assets could be treated as a factor that increases public ﬁnance sustainabi-
lity, this not necessarily must have been appreciated before 2008. Freeing 
up public assets via e.g. privatization usually increases efﬁciency and returns. 
As banking sector variable coefﬁcients show, efﬁciency had been preferred to 
safety.
Two variables are found to be strongly signiﬁcant, regardless the estima-
ted speciﬁcation and both are unrelated to country-speciﬁc fundamentals. The 
ﬁrst one is global risk factor (spread between US Treasuries and medium-risk 
US corporate bonds), while the second captures the common dynamic factors, 
which inﬂuence spreads in a symmetric way. 
Our results show that the crisis has fundamentally changed the behavior 
of ﬁnancial markets. Spreads started to increase around mid-2008 and this 
process intensiﬁed after the collapse of the Lehman Brothers in September 
2008, which is reﬂected by the statistically signiﬁcant dummy variable for the 
fourth quarter of 2008.  Estimations conducted on the crisis period (starting 
from 2009) reveal a structural shift in the sovereign risk assessment.
First, the ﬁnancial markets have become more myopic. This is conﬁrmed by 
the ﬁrst expectations scheme outperforming all the other in the second period 
(table 3)6. This ﬁnding is justiﬁed by the fact that short-term forecast revisions 
in turbulent times are important and contain high information loading, while 
longer-term forecasts are subject to elevated uncertainty, which reduce their 
relevance.
6 With one exception of speciﬁcation (5), which performed better under fourth expectations scheme. 
However, RMSEs guide us to focus on ﬁrst two speciﬁcations in the crisis period. Tables with 
estimations based on other expectations schemes are available upon request.
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Second, factors driving sovereign spreads became different. It is much ea-
sier to select best speciﬁcations in the crisis period. Errors generated in spe-
ciﬁcations (1) and (2) clearly outperform the other. Global risk factor is now 
4-5 times stronger as a spread determinant compared to the pre-crisis times. 
Other macroeconomic variables that strongly inﬂuenced spreads during the 
crisis have been the general government balance and unemployment rate. The 
latter might be used as a better indicator of domestic demand perspectives 
than expected GDP growth (again not signiﬁcant), which was largely inﬂuen-
ced by net exports during the crisis. Consequently, a one percentage point in-
crease in expected unemployment rate boosts government spread inasmuch. 
High (negative) coefﬁcients on expected general government balance provide 
an evidence of ﬁnancial markets’ return to fundamentals-based sovereign risk 
assessment, in line with arguments of De Grauwe and Ji (2012). At the same 
time, the sudden simultaneous increase in importance of domestic demand 
and ﬁscal balance short-run perspectives reﬂect a trap, in which some ﬁscally 
stressed countries found themselves. It was manifested by the IMF’s Olivier 
Blanchard “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” in April 20127. It should be 
noted however, that the postulated improvement in the risk assessment quality 
was not complete. It appears that controlling for other determinants, including 
the (again highly signiﬁcant) “common dynamic factors”, public debt/GDP ratio 
was not a signiﬁcant driver of sovereign spreads. Indeed, this is a very slow-
moving variable and general government balance developments started to be 
more closely tracked as indices of public ﬁnance sustainability.
A major change also occurred in the perception of banking sector and sove-
reign risk nexus. Following the problems observed in highly-leveraged ﬁnancial 
systems and episodes of debt transfer from the private to public sector, ban-
king leverage (measured by loan-to-deposit ratio) has started to be perceived 
as hazardous imbalances rather than indicate entrepreneurship. Indeed, incre-
asing loan-to-deposit ratio by 1 percentage point raises government spread by 
1.5 percentage points in the crisis period.
7 These words were uttered as a comment on a warning addressed at the Spanish government of 
a potentially negative consequences of ﬁscal tightening and were widely interpreted as accusing 
ﬁnancial markets of “schizophrenia” in assessing sovereign credit risk.
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6. SUMMARY
The ﬁnancial crisis has led to important changes in the process of sovereign 
risk assessment. More importantly, these changes have not been well recognized 
by economic policymakers and much justiﬁable doubt has been raised on con-
sistency and rationality of ﬁnancial markets’ behavior towards sovereigns. In this 
paper we check whether this change has occurred only with respect to variables 
considered or whether the expectation scheme has changed, i.e. ﬁnancial mar-
kets have started discounting information from other forecast horizon. 
Our results show that indeed major changes occurred in both these di-
mensions. Since 2009 ﬁnancial markets became more myopic, compared to 
the “normal times” from before the crisis. As it is also found in some other pa-
pers, fundamental macroeconomic and ﬁscal variables started to play a more 
important role in driving the spreads, but the story seems to me more subtle. 
Fiscal balance is found to be more important than government debt (the latter 
being a very slow-moving variable) and short-run growth perspectives seem to 
started being assessed based on domestic demand indicators (such as unem-
ployment rate evolution) rather than simply expected GDP growth. Indeed, we 
observed some countries experiencing a slump in demand during the crisis, 
which was largely offset by positive contributions of net exports due to strong 
declines in imports. The results also suggest that the role of exports price com-
petitiveness, measured by ULC developments might have been exaggerated as 
a factor of sovereign risk. Most EMU countries rely on non-price competitive-
ness of their goods and services, so it is directly the current account to GDP 
ratio which matters more for inﬂuencing the overall economy competitiveness, 
while labor costs do not matter that much.  
Another ﬁnding of our exercise was related to the perception of banking 
sector leverage. In line with a common belief we show evidence that the impact 
of raising this leverage on sovereign risk reversed as the crisis struck, which 
must have contributed to the sudden, substantial increase in sovereign spreads 
in some countries, formerly appreciated by the ﬁnancial markets.
It is a common conclusion of earlier studies that global risk started to beco-
me an ample driver of sovereign spreads in the crisis regime. We conﬁrm this 
ﬁnding, but we also show that global risk was important even before the crisis. 
Moreover, there were some additional common factors inﬂuencing spreads be-
fore as well as during the crisis, which are aggregated in the “common dynamic 
process” extracted in the AMG procedure, which was employed in this paper.
Our paper has provided some new insights on how sovereign spreads are 
determined, but it has also indicated some new research problems for future. 
First, the time horizon of forecasted variables in the sovereign credit risk as-
sessment mechanism are worth analyzing in more detail. Second, since the 
“common dynamic process” indicates that some variables auxiliary to global 
risk play a role in pricing bonds, it might be important to try to identify these 
factors explicitly to check whether they have a truly symmetric impact on the 
governments spreads.
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As for the policy implications, our results offer limited support for the drive 
towards achieving ﬁscal sustainability in the desire to lower government bond 
yields, commonly observed in Eurozone (e.g. in’t Veld et al., 2012), but also 
in other countries (e.g. Krajewski et al., 2015). While the general government 
balance is taken into account in pricing the yields, the role of public debt was 
not found to be signiﬁcant, after controlling for other variables. It seems that 
prudence in the ﬁnancial sector (including preventing risks of spillovers from 
ﬁnancial sector to public ﬁnance) is a stronger guarantee of low yields during 
economic havoc. Further policy implications will follow the uncovering of the 
common dynamic process, but its revealed signiﬁcance might already suggest 
the need for more policy coordination at the Eurozone level.
ANNEX
Presentation of expectation schemes.
Let be the forecast of variable xi for year o , published in the June 
(December) OECD economic outlook of year o-1 . For each expectation sche-
me our dataset forms a matrix with elements xit,n , where nİ{1,2,3,4} denotes 
quarter of year t:
A) Scheme 1 (myopic markets)
B) Scheme 2 (forward-looking markets)
1J(D)
ix
  














+
+
=














D
i
D
i
J
i
J
i
J
i
1-D
i
it,4
it,3
it,2
it,1
x
2/)x(x
x
2/)x(x
x
x
x
x
 














+
+
=














+
++
+
++
D
1i
D
1i
J
1i
J
1i
J
1i
1-D
1i
it,4
it,3
it,2
it,1
x
2/)x(x
x
2/)x(x
x
x
x
x
 
64 PAWEL GAJEWSKI
C) Scheme 3 (gradual shift)
D) Scheme 4 (gradual shift with smoothing)
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